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A NEW NORMAL: HOW COVID-19 AND DIGITAL CONTACT
TRACING HIGHLIGHT A NEED FOR NEW FOURTH
AMENDMENT NORMS
ABSTRACT
Contact tracing helps epidemiologists identify individuals who have been
exposed to a virus. Manual contact tracing has been used for decades to
interrupt the transmission of disease and reduce the number of infections within
a population. It is a pillar of disease control. But the manual process has certain
limitations—it is time-intensive, expensive, and subject to human error. Digital
contact tracing overcomes these limitations. Using GPS and Bluetooth
technologies, digital contact tracing applications automate and expedite the
tracing and notification processes, with life-saving implications. In 2020,
countries that implemented contact tracing technology in response to COVID19 contained outbreaks, minimized incidence of the virus, and kept death tolls
comparatively low.
Notwithstanding the urgent public health need COVID-19 created, privacyminded Americans were and continue to be resistant to digital contact tracing.
Instead of widespread adoption of the technology, there is widespread concern
that data collected via contact tracing apps will be co-opted, de-anonymized,
and used by law enforcement for non-public health purposes.
Is this concern warranted? Can the government demand a record of your
location data from Apple and Google without implicating your Fourth
Amendment rights? Can it secure this data without a warrant or probable
cause? The answer to all these questions is, most likely, yes. Although the Fourth
Amendment limits the government’s search and seizure powers, Americans who
opt to use contact tracing apps—for the sake of their health and the public health
at large—position themselves outside the bounds of Fourth Amendment
protections. In other words, Americans can choose health or privacy, but not
both.
Surely, that should not be our norm. We need a new normal. This Comment,
therefore, discusses how jurisprudence fails to protect the rights of U.S. citizens
using contact tracing applications. It details the current Fourth Amendment tests
and doctrines, including the Katz test (which centers around reasonable
expectations of privacy) and the third-party doctrine (which says a person has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information supplied to third parties).
Given the public health benefits of an effective contact tracing system, this
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Comment considers why changes to the Fourth Amendment framework—ones
that accommodate the competing privacy and welfare needs of the twenty-first
century—are warranted. Ultimately, this Comment proposes that the Supreme
Court eliminate the Katz test and overturn the third-party doctrine to extend
Fourth Amendment protections to information like location data captured by
life-saving technologies.
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INTRODUCTION
The first U.S. case of COVID-19 was reported in January 2020.1 Since then,
more than half a million Americans have died.2 Contact tracing applications,
which use digital technology to help track and limit the spread of disease, have
proven effective.3 But in the United States, privacy concerns4 severely stunt their
life-saving potential.5 Rejection of this technology—despite the pressing need a
pandemic presents—highlights significant flaws and room for improvement in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
This Comment is divided into four parts. Part I pertains to contact tracing
and COVID-19. Section A introduces traditional contact tracing, its function
during a public health crisis, and its limitations. Section B discusses a new form
of contact tracing—digital contact tracing, which relies on the adoption of either
GPS or Bluetooth technologies—and its implementation in the United States.
Section C outlines the privacy concerns associated with digital contact tracing,
and section D identifies the implications of those concerns in the context of
COVID-19. Section E considers how developers of contact tracing apps have
sought to address privacy concerns in the United States.
Given that digital contact tracing is a new technology, Part II examines
Fourth Amendment precedent concerning new technologies. Section A
considers the types of questions courts might be asked with respect to digital
contact tracing. Section B provides an analysis of major Fourth Amendment
cases that address new technologies with similar characteristics to digital contact
tracing. Section C makes note of additional Fourth Amendment doctrine relevant
to digital contact tracing.
Part III applies Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to digital contact tracing
technology. Highlighting key parts of preeminent cases, this Part considers how
precedent might be used to decide a case involving digital contact tracing
applications.
1
First Travel-Related Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus Detected in United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0121-novel-coronavirustravel-case.html.
2
COVID Data Tracker, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-datatracker/#datatracker-home (last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
3
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-666SP, CONTACT TRACING APPS 1–2 (2020).
4
Adam Janos, If Google Can Have Your Data, Can Police Investigating Crimes Have It Too?, A&E:
TRUE CRIME BLOG (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.aetv.com/real-crime/smart-wearable-home-technology-appsdata-solving-crimes.
5
I. Glenn Cohen, Lawrence O. Gostin & Daniel J. Weitzner, Digital Smartphone Tracking for COVID19: Public Health and Civil Liberties in Tension, 323 JAMA 2371, 2371 (2020).
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To conclude, Part IV proposes an alternative theory to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Section A outlines concurrences and dissents that have come out
of landmark Fourth Amendment cases, and section B uses the ideas proposed to
suggest alternatives to current jurisprudence.
I.

CONTACT TRACING AND COVID-19

This Part describes traditional contact tracing, its function during a public
health crisis, and its limitations. It then discusses a new form of contact tracing
that relies on GPS or Bluetooth technologies—digital contact tracing—and its
implementation in the United States. Next, it outlines privacy concerns
associated with digital contact tracing and considers how those concerns curtail
user adoption and have negative implications in the context of COVID-19.
Finally, this Part considers how developers of contact tracing apps have sought
to address privacy concerns.
A. Traditional Contact Tracing
Contact tracing is a public health tool used to interrupt the transmission of
disease and reduce the number of infections within a population.6 Traditionally,
contact tracing has been conducted manually by human tracers, who are usually
public health officials trained to identify infected individuals, track down their
contacts, notify those contacts of potential exposure, and propose measures—
such as quarantines—to prevent or limit the spread of disease.7 For decades,
epidemiologists have used contact tracing “to tackle everything from foodborne
illnesses to sexually transmitted diseases, as well as recent outbreaks of SARS
and Ebola.”8
Although manual contact tracing is a pillar of disease control, it has
limitations.9 Interviewing infectious patients and retracing their interactions can
be time-intensive, and if the particular disease spreads easily, the list of potential
contacts can be overwhelming.10 Indeed, in a report published in April 2020,
6
PATRICIA MOLONEY FIGLIOLA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11559, DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING
TECHNOLOGY: OVERVIEW AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2020).
7
See ERIC N. HOLMES & CHRIS D. LINEBAUGH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10511, COVID-19: DIGITAL
CONTACT TRACING AND PRIVACY LAW 1 (2020).
8
Christie Aschwanden, Contact Tracing, a Key Way to Slow COVID-19, Is Badly Underused by the
U.S., SCI. AM. (July 21, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/contact-tracing-a-key-way-to-slowcovid-19-is-badly-underused-by-the-u-s/.
9
See Alejandro De La Garza, What Is Contact Tracing? Here’s How It Could Be Used to Help Fight
Coronavirus, TIME (Apr. 22, 2020, 11:29 AM), https://time.com/5825140/what-is-contact-tracing-coronavirus/.
10
Id.
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shortly after the outbreak of COVID-19, the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School
of Public Health’s Center for Health Security recommended that 100,000 contact
tracers be added to the U.S. workforce to make COVID-19 contact tracing
initiatives effective.11 It was estimated that implementing a recommendation of
this magnitude would cost $3.6 billion.12 In addition, manual contact tracing is
limited because infected individuals might misreport where they have been or
who they have seen, either intentionally or unintentionally, which diminishes the
effectiveness of the process.13
B. Digital Contact Tracing
Given the inefficiencies and costs associated with manual contact tracing,
there has been a push to digitize the process with smartphone applications
(apps)14—a development made possible by new technologies.15 Using Global
Positioning System (GPS) signals, Bluetooth capabilities, or a combination of
the two,16 contact tracing apps identify people who have come in close contact.
GPS apps log a user’s location, whereas Bluetooth apps collect identifiers of the
smartphones that cross paths.17 In either case, information is digitally stored.18
Then, if an app user receives an positive diagnosis and voluntarily reports their
infection, the stored data is leveraged to notify other users of their exposure.19
By automating the process, apps expedite contact tracing, eliminating some of
the inefficiencies inherent in a manual approach.20 In the face of communicable
disease, apps are able to notify a greater proportion of exposed individuals more

11
CRYSTAL WATSON, ANITA CICERO, JAMES BLUMENSTOCK & MICHAEL FRASER, A NATIONAL PLAN TO
ENABLE COMPREHENSIVE COVID-19 CASE FINDING AND CONTACT TRACING IN THE U.S. 10 (2020),
https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/pubs_archive/pubs-pdfs/2020/200410-national-plan-tocontact-tracing.pdf.
12
Id. at 3.
13
See, e.g., Jaclyn Diaz, Australian State Cuts COVID Lockdown Short, Saying Man Lied to Contact
Tracers, NPR (Nov. 20, 2020, 4:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/11/20/
936957351/australian-state-cuts-covid-lockdown-short-saying-man-lied-to-contact-tracers.
14
FIGLIOLA, supra note 6.
15
Id.
16
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 3.
17
Jack Morse, Sorry, Contact-Tracing Apps Are Not Coming to the Rescue, MASHABLE (May 13, 2020),
https://mashable.com/article/contact-tracing-apps-will-not-stop-coronavirus/.
18
Cristina Criddle & Leo Kelion, Coronavirus Contact-Tracing: World Split Between Two Types of App,
BBC NEWS (May 7, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52355028; Yoshua Bengio, Daphne Ippolito,
Richard Janda, Max Jarvine, Benjamin Prud’homme, Jean-François Rousseau, Abhinav Sharma & Yun William
Yu, Inherent Privacy Limitations of Decentralized Contact Tracing Apps, 28 JAMA 193, 193–94 (2021).
19
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 3.
20
Id.
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quickly and more accurately, without the expense of a workforce of manual
tracers.21
In light of these benefits, digital contact tracing carried huge public health
potential with respect to COVID-19, both when the virus first emerged and as
new variants developed.22 At the height of the of outbreak, experts argued
COVID-19 could be suppressed if digital contact tracing was implemented.23
But this seemingly simple solution was complicated by two factors. The
effectiveness of contact tracing apps depends on: (1) the level of adoption within
a particular population and (2) the type of technology—GPS or Bluetooth—
used. Decisions related to these factors prevented digital contact tracing from
reaching its potential in the United States.
1. Factors Affecting App Potential
Research suggests contact tracing apps have “an effect at all levels of
uptake.”24 However, digital contact tracing is most effective when a large
proportion of the population consistently carries a compatible mobile device and
enables contact tracing functionality.25 From a public health lens, high levels of
app adoption are ideal because suppression is the utmost goal.26 The more people
enrolled as potential contacts, the more complete the tracing, and the better the
app is at identifying exposure.27 For context, a simulation conducted in response
to COVID-19 found the pandemic could have been suppressed if eighty percent
of all smartphone users utilized contact tracing apps.28
Effectiveness also depends on whether a contact tracing app is built with
GPS or Bluetooth capabilities. In their first iteration, most contact tracing apps

21

Id.
Id.
23
Cohen et al., supra note 5.
24
Patrick Howell O’Neill, No, Coronavirus Apps Don’t Need 60% Adoption to be Effective, MIT TECH.
REV. (June 5, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/05/1002775/covid-apps-effective-at-lessthan-60-percent-download/.
25
Andrew Lee, Contact Tracing Is Working Around the World—Here’s What the UK Needs to Do to
Succeed Too, CONVERSATION (June 9, 2020, 9:05 AM), https://theconversation.com/contact-tracing-is-workingaround-the-world-heres-what-the-uk-needs-to-do-to-succeed-too-140293.
26
See Tracking COVID-19: Contact Tracing in the Digital Age, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 9, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/tracking-covid-19-contact-tracing-in-the-digital-age.
27
Chiara Farronato, Marco Iansiti, Marcin Bartosiak, Stefano Denicolai, Luca Ferretti & Roberto
Fontana, How to Get People to Actually Use Contact-Tracing Apps, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 15, 2020), https://
hbr.org/2020/07/how-to-get-people-to-actually-use-contact-tracing-apps.
28
Cohen et al., supra note 5, at 2732.
22
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were designed to capture GPS data.29 GPS-based apps record a user’s location.30
Location data is useful to public health officials because it reveals “hotspots”—
physical areas of elevated disease occurrence or risk.31 Opportunities for
notification are not limited to app users if location information is collected.32
Meaning, infected individuals who have not installed contact tracing apps can
still aid in digital notification efforts.33 Those without an app who receive a
diagnosis can let health professionals know where they have been.34 After, an
alert can be sent to those with apps who visited the same locations according to
their stored GPS data.35 For this reason, GPS-based apps are helpful in contact
tracing efforts.
Contact tracing apps built with Bluetooth technology capture less
information than those using GPS data.36 Bluetooth-based apps keep a record of
devices that have been in close proximity.37 These apps notify users of potential
exposure based on person-to-person encounters, not app users’ locations.38
Without location data, Bluetooth-based apps overlook cases of “environmental
transmission,” where disease passes between individuals even though their
phones are not within the proximity needed for Bluetooth recognition.39
Moreover, technology experts worry about the general accuracy of Bluetooth
technology.40 The strength of a phone’s Bluetooth signal varies from time to
time, and Bluetooth transmission is vulnerable to interference from other
signals.41 As a result, data collected by Bluetooth-based apps is often incomplete
29
Jack Morse, North Dakota Launched a Contact-Tracing App. It’s Not Going Well, MASHABLE (May 6,
2020), https://mashable.com/article/north-dakota-contact-tracing-app/.
30
Id.
31
Shannon Bond, Apple, Google Coronavirus Tool Won’t Track Your Location. That Worries Some
States, NPR (May 13, 2020, 2:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/13/855064165/apple-google-coronavirustech-wont-track-your-location-that-worries-some-states.
32
Matteo Luccio, Using Contact Tracing and GPS to Fight Spread of COVID-19, GPS WORLD (June 3,
2020), https://www.gpsworld.com/using-contact-tracing-and-gps-to-fight-spread-of-covid-19/.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Mark Zastrow, Coronavirus Contact-Tracing Apps: Can They Slow the Spread of Covid-19?, NATURE
(May 19, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01514-2.
37
Kylie Foy, Bluetooth Signals from Your Smartphone Could Automate Covid-19 Contact Tracing While
Preserving Privacy, MIT NEWS (Apr. 8, 2020), https://news.mit.edu/2020/bluetooth-covid-19-contact-tracing0409.
38
Id.
39
Andy Greenberg, How Apple and Google Are Enabling Covid-19 Contact-Tracing, WIRED (Apr. 10,
2020, 3:37 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/apple-google-bluetooth-contact-tracing-covid-19/.
40
Sam Biddle, The Inventors of Bluetooth Say There Could Be Problems Using Their Tech for
Coronavirus Contact Tracing, INTERCEPT (May 5, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/05/05/coronavirusbluetooth-contact-tracing/.
41
Adam Vaughan, Bluetooth May Not Work Well Enough to Trace Coronavirus Contacts,
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and may reflect more false negatives than GPS-based data.42 Overall, with
regard to disease control, Bluetooth-based apps are less effective.43
2. Implementation in the United States
On April 10, 2020, Apple and Google announced a partnership to support
the United States in the development of digital contact tracing apps.44 Their
app—Exposure Notification—utilized Bluetooth technology, not GPS data.45 In
the companies’ joint statement, Exposure Notification was described as follows:
Once enabled, users’ devices will regularly send out a beacon via
Bluetooth that includes a random Bluetooth identifier—basically, a
string of random numbers that aren’t tied to a user’s identity and
change every 10–20 minutes for additional protection. Other phones
will be listening for these beacons and broadcasting theirs as well.
When each phone receives another beacon, it will record and securely
store that beacon on the device. At least once per day, the system will
download a list of the keys for the beacons that have been verified as
belonging to people confirmed as positive for COVID-19. Each device
will check the list of beacons it has recorded against the list
downloaded from the server. If there is a match between the beacons
stored on the device and the positive diagnosis list, the user may be
notified and advised on steps to take next.46

To summarize, Apple and Google’s Exposure Notification technology enables
contact tracing based on the physical proximity of smartphones.47 Apple and
Google’s decision to use Bluetooth technology over GPS technology and their
repeated assertions that contact data is “securely store[d]” are intended to
minimize privacy concerns and increase user adoption in the United States.48
But the privacy concerns raised by this technology are objectively valid and have

NEWSCIENTIST (May 12, 2020), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2243137-bluetooth-may-not-work-wellenough-to-trace-coronavirus-contacts/.
42
See id.
43
Stephen Nellis & Paresh Dave, Apple, Google Ban Use of Location Tracking in Contact Tracing Apps,
REUTERS (May 4, 2020, 12:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-apps/applegoogle-ban-use-of-location-tracking-in-contact-tracing-apps-idUSKBN22G28W.
44
Press Release, Apple & Google, Exposure Notifications Frequently Asked Questions (Sept. 2020) (on
file at https://covid19-static.cdn-apple.com/applications/covid19/current/static/contact-tracing/pdf/
ExposureNotification-FAQv1.2.pdf).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Gregory Barber, Google and Apple Change Tactics on Contact Tracing Tech, WIRED (Sept. 1, 2020,
2:42 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/google-apple-change-tactics-contact-tracing-tech/.
48
Id.
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not been reconciled.49 As a result, contact tracing apps were not widely
implemented in the United States in response to the pandemic.
C. Privacy Concerns Associated with Digital Contact Tracing
Contact tracing apps, whether of the GPS or Bluetooth variety, compile huge
databases ripe for misuse by public entities.50 Apps that use GPS technology
present risks of government surveillance because they track a user’s movements
and activities.51 Apps that use Bluetooth technology present indirect but similar
risks because Bluetooth data can be used to create “social graphs” that unveil a
user’s social interactions.52 As one privacy group suggests, people are “open to
traditional contact tracing involving individuals working under the auspices of
the health department” but are generally distrustful of electronic contact
tracing.53 Many worry contact tracing is “basically electronic surveillance.”54
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and a group of 200 scientists, for
example, expressed hesitation with respect to contact tracing apps given the
potential for overreach.55 In a joint white paper, these advocates argued that
“[w]hile some of these systems may offer public health benefits, they may also
cause significant risks to privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.”56
The response to contact tracing apps in Norway, an early adopter of the
technology, lends credence to the privacy concerns expressed by the ACLU.57
49
Laura Hecht-Felella & Kaylana Mueller-Hsia, Rating the Privacy Protections of State Covid-19
Tracking Apps, BRENNAN CTR. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/rating-privacyprotections-state-covid-19-tracking-apps.
50
Contact Tracing Apps: Which Countries Are Doing What, MED. XPRESS (Apr. 28, 2020), https://
medicalxpress.com/news/2020-04-contact-apps-countries.html.
51
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, CONTACT TRACING APPS: A NEW WORLD FOR DATA PRIVACY (2021),
https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-us/knowledge/publications/d7a9a296/contact-tracing-apps-a-newworld-for-data-privacy.
52
Natasha Lomas, EU Privacy Experts Push a Decentralized Approach to COVID-19 Contacts Tracing,
TECH CRUNCH (Apr. 6, 2020, 2:42 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/06/eu-privacy-experts-push-a-decentralizedapproach-to-covid-19-contacts-tracing/.
53
Amy Lauren Fairchild, Lawrence O. Gostin & Ronald Bayer, Contact Tracing’s Long, Turbulent
History Holds Lessons for COVID-19, CONVERSATION (July 16, 2020, 8:15 AM), https://theconversation.com/
contact-tracings-long-turbulent-history-holds-lessons-for-covid-19-142511.
54
Id.
55
Jessica Davis, ACLU, Scientists Urge Privacy Focus for COVID-19 Tracing Technology, HEALTH IT
SEC. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://healthitsecurity.com/news/aclu-scientists-urge-privacy-focus-for-covid-19-tracingtechnology.
56
DANIEL KAHN GILLMOR, PRINCIPLES FOR TECHNOLOGY-ASSISTED CONTACT-TRACING 1 (2020),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_white_paper_-_contact_tracing_principles.pdf.
57
Todd Ehret, Data Privacy Laws Collide with Contact Tracing Efforts; Privacy is Prevailing, REUTERS
(July 21, 2020, 2:36 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-data-privacy-contact-tracing/data-privacylaws-collide-with-contact-tracing-efforts-privacy-is-prevailing-idUSKCN24M1NL.
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In June 2020, the Norwegian Data Protection Authority ordered the Norwegian
Institute of Public Health to suspend use of and delete all data collected via
contact tracing technology.58 The Norwegian Data Protection Authority said
digital contact tracing presents a disproportionate risk to privacy.59
Other countries decided the risk was worthwhile.60 In particular, East Asian
countries responded to COVID-19 in a way that plainly favors public health over
privacy, and the COVID-19 related benefits have been clear.61 In March 2020,
a contact tracing app called TraceTogether launched in Singapore to supplement
manual contact tracing efforts.62 By December 2020, 3.4 million people
(approximately sixty percent of Singapore’s population) downloaded
TraceTogether, which uses Bluetooth signals.63 Singapore’s success is in part
attributable to other measures—such as strict lockdowns and mask
requirements—but government officials and experts maintain that participation
in TraceTogether was a key factor in Singapore’s ability to minimize incidence
of the virus and reopen relatively quickly.64 As a point of comparison,
Singapore’s and Norway’s populations are comparable in size but their mortality
rates (per 100,000 people) a year into the COVID-19 pandemic differed
drastically, standing at 0.56% and 9.58% respectively.65
However, there is a tradeoff. Singapore had one of the lowest COVID-19
fatality rates globally and was recognized by the World Health Organization for
its pandemic response.66 But with the virus at bay, the country has been criticized
58

Id.
Id.
60
See Tim McDonnell, How Finland Got 20% of Its Population to Download a Contact Tracing App in
One Day, QUARTZ (Sept. 2, 2020), https://qz.com/1898960/whats-behind-finlands-contact-tracing-app-successuser-privacy/.
61
See Yasheng Huang, Meicen Sun & Yuze Sui, How Digital Contact Tracing Slowed Covid-19 in East
Asia, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/how-digital-contact-tracing-slowed-covid-19in-east-asia.
62
Covid-19 Apps Need Due Diligence, 580 NATURE 563, 563 (2020).
63
Yoolim Lee, Singapore App Halves Contact Tracing Time Leading Engineer Says, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 8, 2020, 7:54 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-08/singapore-app-halves-contacttracing-time-leading-engineer-says.
64
Laurel Wamsley, Singapore Says COVID-19 Contact-Tracing Data Can Be Requested by Police, NPR
(Jan. 5, 2021, 3:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2021/01/05/953604553/singaporesays-covid-19-contact-tracing-data-can-be-requested-by-police; Hallam Stevens, Does the Take-up of
Singapore’s TraceTogether Really Show Increased Trust in the Government?, S. CHINA MORNING POST
(Dec. 31, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3115863/does-take-singaporestracetogether-really-show-increased-trust.
65
Mortality Analyses, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. & MED.: CORONAVIRUS RES. CTR., https://coronavirus.jhu.
edu/data/mortality (last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
66
Jason Beaubien, Singapore Was a Shining Star In COVID-19 Control—Until It Wasn’t, NPR (May 3,
2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/05/03/849135036/singapore-was-a-shining59

FONG_1.31.22

2022]

1/31/2022 3:19 PM

COVID-19 AND DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING

665

with regard to privacy.67 In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, the
government assured Singaporeans that TraceTogether was anonymized and
encrypted and that the data would be used “purely for contact tracing, period.”68
But in January 2021, it was reported that COVID-19 contact tracing data was
available to police.69 The government announced that data could be accessed in
criminal investigations under the country’s Criminal Procedure Code, which
provides government officials the “power to order production of any document
or other thing.”70 After this announcement, officials revealed contact tracing data
had “already been used [by police] in a murder investigation.”71 Although
Singaporeans have been described as not “particularly privacy conscious,” the
use of contact tracing data for this end “triggered public anger.”72
The circumstances in Singapore and Norway emphasize the competing
interests at play—contact tracing apps can be quite effective in combating
COVID-19 (or other viruses) with a certain amount of buy-in, but they
inherently infringe on users’ privacy interests.
D. The Implications of Privacy Concerns
Privacy interests warrant attention—particularly in the United States—for
two reasons. First, the U.S. Constitution affords a right to be “secure [in] ‘the
privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’”73 Disregard for privacy directly
impacts constitutional rights.74 Second, the privacy concerns raised by contact
tracing apps have negative implications for public health.75 Public concern in the
context of a pandemic is problematic because the more distrust there is in contact
tracing technology, the less likely people are to use these apps and the less
helpful the technology can be in flattening the curve of disease incidence.76

star-in-covid-control-until-it-wasnt.
67
Wamsley, supra note 64 (quoting Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishanan).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Kristen Han, Broken Promises: How Singapore Lost Trust on Contact Tracing Privacy, MIT TECH.
REV. (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/11/1016004/singapore-tracetogether-contact-tracingpolice/.
72
Id.
73
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886)).
74
Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIA. L. REV. 141, 152 (2014).
75
Tracking COVID-19, supra note 26.
76
Farronato et al., supra note 27.
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The partnership between Apple and Google made digital contact tracing
functional with both iOS and Android operating systems, which cover nearly the
entire mobile phone market in the United States.77 That means widespread use
of these apps was certainly possible throughout the duration of the pandemic.78
But “[s]tates [were] slow to develop contact tracing apps, and people [were]
slow to use them.”79 Although apps purported to protect privacy, there was too
much concern that collected data would be co-opted, de-anonymized, and used
by law enforcement and intelligence for non-public health purposes.80 This
concern is warranted—in this context and in the context of similar technology,
like the new Apple AirTag.81 According to Professor Andrew Ferguson, “The
general public’s move to smart digital technology is ‘going to radically change
criminal prosecution’” at the expense of Fourth Amendment rights.82
E. Current Privacy Protections
Both the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control
acknowledge the privacy risks associated with digital contact tracing.83 But
faced with COVID-19’s persistence, they still advocate for widespread adoption
of the technology because of the public health benefits.84 In an attempt to achieve
these benefits but also address the privacy concerns, Apple and Google
promoted user privacy and security as central to their design.85 They argued two
features of their technology in particular were “privacy preserving”: (1) the

77

FIGLIOLA, supra note 6.
See id.
79
Christine Lehmann, Privacy Concerns Hindering Digital Contact Tracing, WEBMD (Sept. 25, 2020),
https://www.webmd.com/lung/news/20200928/privacy-concerns-hindering-digital-contact-tracing.
80
Lomas, supra note 52.
81
AirTags are tracking devices developed by Apple and released in 2021. See, e.g., Aaron Holmes, New
Records Show Google, Microsoft, and Amazon Have Thousands of Previously Unreported Military and Law
Enforcement Contracts, BUS. INSIDER (July 8, 2020, 1:27 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/microsoftgoogle-amazon-pentagon-law-enforcement-contracts-2020-7; Tyler Sonnemaker, Law Enforcement Agencies
Are Using a Legal Loophole to Buy Up Personal Data Exposed by Hackers, BUS. INSIDER (July 8, 2020, 4:54
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/police-buying-hacked-data-bypassing-legal-processes-2020-7; Deanna
Paul, The Battle Between Privacy and Enforcement Isn’t Going Away, GUARDIAN (June 26, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/26/battle-between-privacy-law-enforcement-carpenter.
82
Janos, supra note 4.
83
See Tracking COVID-19, supra note 26; Digital Contact Tracing Tools, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/contact-tracing/contact-tracing-plan/digitalcontact-tracing-tools.html (May 26, 2020).
84
Id.
85
Press Release, Apple Newsroom, Apple and Google Partner on COVID-19 Contact Tracing
Technology (Apr. 10, 2020) (on file at https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2020/04/apple-and-google-partneron-covid-19-contact-tracing-technology/).
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reliance on Bluetooth signals as opposed to GPS data and (2) its opt-in nature.86
First, Bluetooth technology is considered more “privacy-friendly” because,
unlike GPS data, it does not store the “location of possible contacts, only that
two users have been proximate.”87 Second, “[c]hoice is key.”88 In a country like
the United States, it is understood that “[p]eople will avoid participation in a
privacy-sensitive scheme that seems compulsory.”89 Therefore, Exposure
Notification requires that users “download and opt in to an appropriate state or
regional tracing app as well as opt in to the Apple-Google tracking feature in the
operating system.”90 Although Bluetooth functionality and opt in requirements
limit how completely contact tracing apps identify points of exposure,91 apps
that protect users’ privacy garner public trust and, in turn, higher rates of
adoption.92 Since high rates of adoption give contact tracing apps their best
chance at flattening the curve,93 the hope was that “privacy-preserving contact
tracing” would build buy-in and thereby most effectively contain the spread of
COVID-19.94
However, buy-in is not a short-term goal. It is important that “privacypreserving contact tracing” warrants public trust within the legal framework that
governs.95 If purported privacy protections fail to provide actual protection, it
might hamper adoption of contact tracing apps—now, while COVID-19 is still
pressing, and in the future, should other threats to public health surface.96
This Comment’s primary purpose is to consider whether “privacypreserving contact tracing” offers real protection within the framework of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that the answer
is no. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, instead, exacerbates the privacy risks
that curtail digital contact tracing’s potential. In turn, this Comment argues that
reassessing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is necessary not only to promote
the right guaranteed by the text of the Fourth Amendment, but also to advance a
strong governmental interest in public health and enable the nation to control the
86

Id.
FIGLIOLA, supra note 6.
88
Foy, supra note 37.
89
GILLMOR, supra note 56.
90
FIGLIOLA, supra note 6.
91
Foy, supra note 37.
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Ian Barker, Contact Tracing Apps Raise Privacy Fears, BETANEWS (Sept. 15, 2020), https://betanews.
com/2020/09/15/contact-tracing-privacy-fears/.
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Farronato et al., supra note 27.
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Foy, supra note 37.
95
Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing, APPLE, https://covid19.apple.com/contacttracing (last visited
Dec. 17, 2021).
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Barker, supra note 92.
87

FONG_1.31.22

668

1/31/2022 3:19 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:655

spread of disease and end a pandemic. Finally, this Comment reasons that the
Supreme Court should eliminate the Katz test, expand the Carpenter holding to
apply generally to digital location data (including location data captured by
Bluetooth technology), and overturn the third-party doctrine.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Twenty-First Century Plaintiff
“Can the government demand a copy of all your e-mails from Google or
Microsoft without implicating your Fourth Amendment rights? Can it secure
your DNA from 23andMe without a warrant or probable cause?”97 These are
questions Justice Gorsuch posed in his recent dissent from the Supreme Court’s
majority opinion in Carpenter v. United States.98 They parallel the questions
raised by COVID-19 digital contact tracing in the United States: Can the
government demand a record of your location data from Apple and Google
without implicating your Fourth Amendment rights? Can it secure this data
without a warrant or probable cause? These questions, which lie at the
intersection of new technology and the Fourth Amendment, are difficult to
answer. The public health benefits of contact tracing add certain intricacies to
an already complex analysis.
Contact tracing data could be useful to law enforcement officials in a variety
of situations. Location data might put someone at the scene of a crime,99
establish incriminating communications,100 or—in the “new normal”101—show
that an individual violated quarantines measures.102 Although quarantine
measures have not been legally enforced since the early 1900s,103 every state has
codified punishments that range in severity.104 Individuals in New Hampshire,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas, for example, can face felony charges for
97

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id.
99
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403–04 (2012); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
100
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
101
“New normal” is a term that has been used to describe life after the outbreak of COVID-19. Lisa
Lockerd Maragakis, The New Normal and Coronavirus, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., https://www.hopkinsmedicine.
org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/coronavirus-new-normal (Aug. 14, 2020).
102
Paulina Cachero, Yes, You Can Face Criminal Charges, Be Fined, and Even Jailed for Breaking a
Coronavirus Quarantine, INSIDER (Mar. 12, 2020, 12:27 PM), https://www.insider.com/breaking-coronavirusquarantine-in-us-jail-charges-fines-2020-3.
103
Legal Authorities: Isolation and Quarantine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
104
State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGS. (Aug. 7, 2021), https://www.
ncsl.org/research/health/state-quarantine-and-isolation-statutes.aspx.
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knowingly and willfully disobeying a health authority order.105 In Wyoming, a
person can face up to a year in prison or a $10,000 fine.106 In a case where the
government seeks to use contact tracing data to establish this sort of violation, a
court would be asked to consider whether the app data implicates the Fourth
Amendment and requires a warrant based on probable cause.
B. Katz, Smith, Jones, and Carpenter
The Fourth Amendment limits the government’s search and seizure powers.
The Amendment provides the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.107

Until the 1960s, the Supreme Court interpreted the Amendment’s propertycentric text quite literally.108 In Olmstead v. United States, for example, the
Supreme Court held that wiretapping without trespass did not amount to a search
or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.109 Relying on this
decision, the Fourth Amendment would be irrelevant for regulating the use of
new technologies to monitor conversations unless the government trespassed on
private property to set up the wiretap.110
Dissenting, Justice Brandeis reiterated the renowned words of Chief Justice
Marshall: “We must never forget . . . that it is a constitution we are
expounding.”111 The Fourth Amendment guarantees certain protections and
those guarantees, he argued, must be upheld in a “changing world.”112 Quoting
from the majority opinion in Weems v. United States, Justice Brandeis
emphasized that “[t]ime works changes, [and] brings into existence new
conditions and purposes,” and so, a principle “must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth.”113 The need for wider

105
106
107
108

Cachero, supra note 102.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353

(1967).
109
110
111
112
113

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 457–58.
See id.
Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819)).
Id.
Id. at 472–73 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
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application of the Fourth Amendment became more apparent as technology
continued to advance.
In 1967, the Court overturned Olmstead.114 But instead of simply adapting
the Fourth Amendment’s protection of “persons, houses, papers, and effects” to
accord with modern day intrusions as Justice Brandeis suggested, the Court
rejected the property-based approach entirely.115 In Katz v. United States, a
seminal case, the Supreme Court held “the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places.”116
The majority opinion in Katz did not lay out a framework for analyzing
potential Fourth Amendment violations based on its “people, not places”
holding.117 However, cases that followed relied upon the reasonable expectation
of privacy test set forth in Justice Harlan’s concurrence.118 This test asks courts
to consider whether “a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy” and whether “the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”119 The adoption of Justice Harlan’s test transparently
underscored privacy as a tenet of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, even though
the word “privacy” does not appear in the text of the Amendment itself.120
The Katz decision guided the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland in
1979.121 This case concerned Patricia McDonough, the victim of a robbery.122
McDonough gave police officers a description of the person who had robbed her
and identified the make and model of the car he was driving.123 In the days

114
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead
and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can
no longer be regarded as controlling.”).
115
Trevor Burrus & James Knight, Katz Nipped and Katz Cradled: Carpenter and the Evolving Fourth
Amendment, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 79, 83 (2018).
116
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
117
Id.
118
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“We have recently held [in Katz v. United States] that
‘the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,’ and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable
‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” (citations omitted)).
119
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has emerged from
prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”).
120
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“To withdraw protection of this minimum
expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”
(emphasis added)).
121
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979).
122
Id. at 737.
123
Id.
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following the robbery, McDonough began receiving threatening calls.124 The
caller identified himself as the robber.125
Soon after, the police spotted a man who matched McDonough’s description
and drove the type of car she identified.126 Officers ran the plates and, after
obtaining Smith’s name, requested—without a warrant or court order—that the
telephone company install a pen register.127 A pen register is an electronic device
that records the numbers dialed from a particular phone number.128 The pen
register revealed Smith made calls to McDonough.129
In this case, the pen register was installed on telephone company property so
there was no physical intrusion of Smith’s property.130 Nevertheless, Smith
sought to exclude evidence of his calls to McDonough, asserting the police
violated his Fourth Amendment right when they used the pen register without a
warrant.131 Smith argued he had a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in the
phone numbers he dialed from the privacy of his own home.132 The Court held
that “the site of the call [was] immaterial for purposes of analysis in this case,”
and instead considered what a pen register reveals.133 Justice Blackmun
emphasized the following:
Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine from the
use of a pen register whether a communication existed. These devices
do not hear sound. They disclose only the telephone numbers that have
been dialed—a means of establishing communication. Neither the
purport of any communication between the called and the recipient of
the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is
disclosed by pen registers.134

The majority concluded the general public does not have “any actual expectation
of privacy in the numbers they dial” because it is understood that telephone
companies see those numbers when calls are connected.135 His conduct was not
and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 741.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 743.
Id.
Id. at 741 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)).
Id. at 742.
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dialed136 because numbers dialed are kept in company records and used by
companies in a variety of ways.137 This holding falls under the third-party
doctrine, which says “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”138 As such, the Court
emphasized that risk is assumed when a person gives information to a third
party:
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government. . . .
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.139

Furthermore, the Court highlighted the utility of a pen register in identifying
persons making annoying or obscene calls and pointed out that most phone
books let subscribers know that telephone companies often help law
enforcement identify those making “unwelcome and troublesome calls.”140
The decisions in Katz and Smith seemed to suggest that privacy concepts
superseded property principles in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. However,
in United States v. Jones, the Court revitalized the ties between Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and common law trespass (a property-based
approach).141
In Jones, respondent Antoine Jones was the target of a joint FBI and
Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department task force.142 He was
suspected of trafficking narcotics.143 As part of their investigation, law
enforcement officials attached a GPS tracking device to a vehicle Jones drove
frequently.144 Using satellite technology, law enforcement tracked the vehicle’s

136

Id. at 743.
Id. at 741.
138
Id. at 743–44.
139
Id. at 744 (quoting United States v. Miller 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
140
Id. at 742–43.
141
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (“[O]ur law holds the property of every man so
sacred.” (citation omitted)).
142
Id. at 402.
143
Id.
144
Id.
137
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location.145 They collected “more than 2,000 pages of data over [a] 4-week
period.”146
The Court considered whether attachment of a GPS tracking device to the
underside of an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to
monitor the vehicle’s movements, constituted a search or seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.147 Guided by the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test, the Government maintained no search had occurred
with respect to the GPS tracking device because Jones did not have a
“‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in the area of the [vehicle] accessed by
Government agents (its underbody) and in the locations of the [vehicle] on the
public roads, which were visible to all.”148 The Court did not address this
contention.149 Instead, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,150 relied on
traditional concepts of property law.151
First, the Court held that a vehicle unequivocally qualifies as an “effect”
under the Fourth Amendment.152 Then, Justice Scalia emphasized that in this
case, the Government physically intruded on private property to secure the GPS
device to the vehicle.153 He concluded that this physical intrusion undoubtedly
amounted to a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.154
Furthermore, Justice Scalia clarified that “[s]ituations involving merely the
transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz
analysis.”155
Though the Jones decision was unanimous, the Justices were divisively split
in their reasoning. Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Scalia’s opinion but wrote a
pointed concurrence.156 She affirmed Jones’s property right, but also concluded
that the government intruded upon privacy interests afforded protection under
145

Id. at 403.
Id.
147
Id. at 402–03.
148
Id. at 406 (citation omitted).
149
Id. (“But we need not address the Government’s contentions, because Jones’s Fourth Amendment
rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation. At bottom, we must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” (citation omitted)).
150
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Sotomayor joined the majority
opinion. Id. at 401.
151
Notably, the decision was unanimous. But Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito wrote concurring
opinions. Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Kagan joined Justice Alito’s concurrence. Id. at 418.
152
Id. at 404.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 404–05.
155
Id. at 411.
156
Id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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the Fourth Amendment.157 She emphasized that “Katz’s reasonable-expectationof-privacy test augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the common-law
trespassory test that preceded it.”158 Moreover, Justice Sotomayor criticized both
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion and the majority opinion.159 By her measure,
Justice Alito’s concurrence “discounts altogether the constitutional relevance of
the Government’s physical intrusion” and the majority’s opinion reflects an
“irreducible constitutional minimum.”160
Because the majority did not assess whether GPS monitoring implicates a
reasonable expectation of privacy, Justice Sotomayor offered some
considerations.161 She acknowledged that GPS monitoring captures a great deal
of public movements.162 Therefore, she would consider “whether people
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a
manner that enables the government to ascertain, more or less at will, their
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”163 Furthermore, her
concurrence prompted the Court to reconsider the third-party doctrine.164 In the
digital age, it is commonplace for individuals to voluntarily turn over personal
information in the course of everyday activities.165 Justice Sotomayor suggested
the third-party doctrine might be outdated and not representative of actual
expectations associated with the voluntary disclosure of information to a third
party.166
Justice Alito concurred solely in the judgment.167 He argued that the only
factor the Court needs to consider is whether the Government’s long-term
monitoring violated Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to
his vehicle.168 According to Justice Alito, Katz did away with the old approach
requiring a property violation in the form of a trespass.169 After Katz, the
question to be decided was not property-related (as Justice Scalia reasoned), but
157

Id.
Id. at 414.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 415.
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Id. (“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that
reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”).
163
Id. at 416.
164
Id. at 417.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 417–18.
167
Id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Id. at 419.
169
Id. at 421–22 (“Katz v. United States finally did away with the old approach, holding that a trespass
was not required for a Fourth Amendment violation.”).
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rather whether the potential intrusion violated the privacy upon which the
individual justifiably relied.170
Justice Alito acknowledged that the Katz test is imperfect.171 He noted that
Justice Harlan’s test assumes somewhat stable privacy expectations, but in
reality, new technology might make it hard to pinpoint fluctuating popular
expectations.172 Justice Alito wrote the following:
Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular
expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant
changes in popular attitudes. New technology may provide increased
convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people
may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not
welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they
may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as
inevitable.173

Justice Sotomayor responded to this point, writing that “[p]erhaps . . . some
people may find the ‘tradeoff’ of privacy for convenience ‘worthwhile,’ or come
to accept this ‘diminution of privacy’ as ‘inevitable,’ and perhaps not.”174
The Supreme Court’s next landmark privacy decision was Carpenter v.
United States.175 In Carpenter, petitioner Timothy Carpenter challenged the
government’s use of 12,898 location points cataloging his movements over a
127-day period, which were used to place him near four robberies he was
charged with committing.176 The Court considered whether accessing historical
cell phone records that provide the Government with a comprehensive chronicle
of the user’s past movements constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment.177 As the Court explained, cell phones continuously connect to cell
sites.178 Every time a smartphone connects to a cell-site signal it generates a
time-stamped location point, which can be used to approximate a phone’s
physical location.179

170
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Id. at 423.
Id. at 427.
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Id. at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts began his analysis
summarizing Fourth Amendment doctrine.180 First, he explained that property
rights are one measure, but not the sole measure, of Fourth Amendment
violations.181 He reaffirmed the Katz test: when an individual has the subjective
intention to preserve something as private, and that expectation of privacy is one
society deems reasonable, “[governmental] intrusion into that sphere qualifies
as a search and requires a warrant supported by probable cause.”182 The Chief
Justice also paid tribute to the Framers’ intentions to “secure ‘the privacies of
life’ against ‘arbitrary power’”183 and implement safeguards against
“permeating police surveillance.”184
Then, Chief Justice Roberts highlighted certain characteristics of the data.
First, he observed that cell-site records revealing the location of a cell phone is
a particular sort of digital data—“personal location information maintained by a
third party”—not addressed by existing precedents.185 He acknowledged that the
data was similar to the data in Jones.186 But emphasized that Jones was different
from the case at hand because it implicated the third-party doctrine, whereby
individuals give up their expectation of privacy when they offer information to
third parties.187 Chief Justice Roberts considered societal expectations regarding
surveillance in the pre-digital age, the fact that digital data provides such an
intimate and comprehensive picture of a person’s life (because of our ubiquitous
use of cell phones), and the retrospective nature of the digital information
(because police do not need to identify a target prior to investigating; the data
can be retrieved after the events they document).188

180

Id. at 2213.
Id. (citing Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992)).
182
Id. at 2213 (“For much of our history, Fourth Amendment search doctrine was ‘tied to common-law
trespass’ and focused on whether the Government ‘obtains information by physically intruding on a
constitutionally protected area.’ More recently, the Court has recognized that ‘property rights are not the sole
measure of Fourth Amendment violations.’” (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405, 406 n.3 (2012)
and Soldal, 506 U.S. at 64)).
183
Id. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
184
Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
185
Id.
186
Id. at 2216 (“Such tracking partakes of many of the qualities of the GPS monitoring we considered in
Jones. Much like GPS tracking of a vehicle, cell phone location information is detailed, encyclopedic, and
effortlessly compiled.”).
187
Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 425, U.S. 435 (1976) (where the Court found no reasonable
expectation of privacy in financial records accessible to a third-party bank) and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979) (where the Court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in records of phone numbers dialed
accessible to a third-party telephone company)).
188
Id. at 2218.
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Although the Carpenter Court did not overrule the third-party doctrine, it
did not apply the doctrine to the presented circumstances.189 Before Carpenter,
the third-party doctrine seemed relatively clear (despite Justice Sotomayor’s
attempt to poke holes190)—information revealed to a third party and then
conveyed to Government authorities loses any Fourth Amendment protection
normally afforded.191 In Carpenter, the Court decided the unique nature of cell
phone location records meant the involvement of a third party could not, on its
own, overcome Carpenter’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.192 The
Court decided an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in
physical movements recorded in cell-site location information whether the
Government obtains the information through its own surveillance or indirectly
from a wireless carrier.193 Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that cell phone location
data “is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term.”194 In some
sense, this was not just a decision about the application of the doctrine, but a
departure from it. The third-party doctrine rests on “the [idea] that an individual
has a reduced expectation of privacy in information [they] knowingly
share[s].”195 But here, the Court looked beyond the act of sharing to the type of
information shared and whether a legitimate expectation of privacy attaches.196
Looking to the type of information shared has huge—albeit unclear—
implications, given that 2.5 quintillion bytes of data are produced by humans
every day.197 Carpenter is still considered “one of the most consequential rulings
regarding privacy in the digital age.”198
C. The Special Needs Doctrine
In addition to being governed by Katz, Smith, Jones, and Carpenter, privacy
in the digital age is affected by the special needs doctrine, which developed in a

189
Id. at 2220 (“We therefore decline to extend Smith and Miller to the collection of CSLI. Given the
unique nature of cell phone location information, the fact that the Government obtained the information from a
third party does not overcome Carpenter’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”).
190
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
191
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
192
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 2220.
195
Id. at 2219.
196
Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)).
197
Jacquelyn Bulao, How Much Data Is Created Every Day in 2021?, TECHJURY, https://techjury.net/
blog/how-much-data-is-created-every-day/#gref (Dec. 7, 2021).
198
Nathan Freed Wessler, The Supreme Court’s Most Consequential Ruling for Privacy in the Digital
Age, One Year In, ACLU (June 28, 2019, 4:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/locationtracking/supreme-courts-most-consequential-ruling-privacy-digital.
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separate line of cases.199 The special needs doctrine is an exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement that law enforcement obtain a warrant based on
probable cause prior to conducting a search or seizure.200 A search or seizure
qualifies for this exception when there is a perceived need that falls outside the
bounds of normal law enforcement and involves an important governmental
interest.201 This exception is not granted often.202 The following section will
apply Fourth Amendment doctrine as it has developed in Katz, Smith, Jones, and
Carpenter to digital contact tracing technology. It will also address the thirdparty doctrine and special needs doctrine because individuals voluntarily give
contact tracing app information to a third-party entity and the context of a global
pandemic, though unprecedented, might amount to a special need.
III. APPLYING CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
There are inherent difficulties in interpreting the Fourth Amendment. The
text is ambiguous and new technologies create circumstances beyond anything
the framers might have considered.203 In theory, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, delineated in Katz, Smith, Jones, and Carpenter, provides an
analytical framework. However, applying Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to
contact tracing apps raises several questions. At best, these questions are not
answered by existing cases. At worst, they demonstrate profound flaws in Fourth
Amendment doctrine.
A. Katz and Contact Tracing: Perhaps and Perhaps Not
In the United States, contact tracing apps are downloaded by the user.204
They implicate the mere transmission of electronic signals without trespass, as
described by Justice Scalia in Jones.205 Therefore, whether the use of digital data
collected via contact tracing apps constitutes a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment would be subject to a Katz analysis.206 In a case involving

199
See Lauren Kobrick, I Am Not Law Enforcement! Why the Special Needs Exception to the Fourth
Amendment Should Apply to Caseworkers Investigating Allegations of Child Abuse, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1505,
1509 (2017).
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Off. State Att’y, W. Palm Beach, Fla., Special Needs Exception, LEGAL EAGLE (Aug. 2014), http://
www.sa15.state.fl.us/stateattorney/ResourceInformation/_content/LegalEagle2014/Aug2014.pdf.
203
David E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth Amendment History, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581,
581 (“The doctrinal incoherence of Fourth Amendment law disturbs many judges and scholars.”).
204
FIGLIOLA, supra note 6.
205
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012).
206
Id.
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the government’s collection of contact tracing data, a Court must consider
whether “a person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and
whether “the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”207
Notably, the first prong of the Katz test has been criticized by legal scholars,
even outside the context of contact tracing. Many argue that a constitutional right
should not rest on an individual’s subjective understanding.208 For example,
according to Professor Anthony Amsterdam, “An actual, subjective expectation
of privacy obviously has no place in a statement of what Katz held or in a theory
of what the fourth amendment protects. It can neither add to, nor can its absence
detract from, an individual’s claim to fourth amendment protection.”209 Still, the
Katz test remains the law. So, we must ask whether digital contact tracing app
users “exhibit an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.”210
As discussed in Part I, the opt-in nature of contact tracing apps has been at
the forefront of all digital contact tracing conversations.211 Agreements
emphasize that users must opt in to data collection and can opt out at any
point.212 A diagnosis is only captured when a user chooses to report it.213 In
addition, app developers have stressed that information collected will remain
private.214 The apps are clearly designed and marketed to make people feel in
control of their personal information.215 Arguably then, users exhibit an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy. There is a general understanding that their
digital data is only being collected for a public health-related purpose and will
not be dispersed for other reasons.
However, the opt-in feature is only emphasized in user agreements and press
coverage because privacy concerns have also been at the forefront of
conversations surrounding this technology.216 A typical app user understands
that downloading, using, and reporting results via contact tracing apps is a choice
because that choice puts their privacy at some risk.217 In fact, the privacy
207

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974).
209
Id.
210
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
211
Supra Part I.E.
212
Brian Fung, Apple and Google’s Contact Tracing System Gets Deeper Integration into iOS, Android,
CNN BUS., https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/01/tech/apple-google-contact-tracing/index.html (Sept. 1, 2020).
213
Id.
214
Press Release, Apple & Google, supra note 44.
215
Id.
216
Foy, supra note 37.
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Lehmann, supra note 79.
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framework for Apple and Google informs users of the following: “Information
such as location history, symptom reports, demographic information, or similar
shared with public health officials or researchers must never be linked back to
or used to re-identify individuals, even by entities legally allowed to perform
such linkage.”218 At first glance, this might seem to offer privacy protections.
But on its face, this statement clearly indicates that there might be entities legally
allowed to link private information to users.219 Therefore, if presented with a
digital contact tracing case, a Court might find that the user did not exhibit an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy because there is so much information
circulating about how un-private these apps are.
The second prong of the Katz test asks whether “the expectation of privacy
[is] one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”220 In the case of
digital contact tracing, the issues raised by this prong are similar to those raised
by the first prong of the Katz test.221 The technology is so new that society’s
expectations are just as unformed as the expectations of individuals. If the
general public is encouraged to use these apps—touted as being “designed with
privacy in mind”—is there an expectation that privacy is protected or that
privacy is at stake despite best intentions?
Ultimately, there is no clear answer. As Justice Sotomayor proclaimed in
Jones, in an attempt to apply the Katz test, “Perhaps, some people may find the
‘tradeoff’ of privacy for convenience ‘worthwhile,’ or come to accept this
‘diminution of privacy’ as ‘inevitable,’ and perhaps not.”222
B. Smith and Contact Tracing: It’s Ambiguous
Under the existing rollout of digital contact tracing in the United States,
Apple and Google control a central server where contact data is stored.223
Therefore, the third-party doctrine requires some consideration. According to
this doctrine, “[a] person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information

218
Data Rights for Exposure Notification, EXPOSURE NOTIFICATION, http://exposurenotification.org/
(May 20, 2020).
219
Id.
220
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
221
The two prongs—whether “a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and
whether the expectation” is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”—are equally ambiguous.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
222
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
223
Barber, supra note 47.
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he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”224 When information is shared, the
risk might be assumed.225
The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and the third-party doctrine
were applied to new technologies in Smith and Carpenter.226 Therefore, these
cases offer precedential value for assessing digital contact tracing apps under the
Fourth Amendment. In the following paragraphs, this Comment will discuss
why the case of digital contact tracing is similar to Smith (where the Supreme
Court held there was no legitimate expectation of privacy)227 and how it might
be distinguished from Carpenter (where the Supreme Court held there was a
legitimate expectation of privacy).228
Smith presents a similar case to digital contact tracing because (1) the
information revealed was ambiguous,229 (2) there was a public interest in
collecting the information,230 and (3) there was notice to users about access by
other entities.231 In Smith, the Supreme Court decided that installation and use
of a pen register did not require a warrant.232 Digital contact tracing apps and the
pen register implicated in Smith share certain commonalities. Like pen registers,
contact tracing apps reveal parties that have come in contact with each other.233
Of course, contacts recorded by these technologies might mean different
things—a pen register’s records imply communication between parties,234
whereas contact tracing data captures physical proximity and includes
circumstances where parties may have been close enough to spread COVID-19
but never actually engaged in conversation.235 Still, the pen register and contact
tracing apps are similar in that they capture some sort of interaction. And the
ambiguity involved in each makes these recorded contacts more alike for
purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. In each case, much about the
interaction documented by the technology is left undisclosed. According to the
Court in Smith, the pen register data was somewhat ambiguous because
“[n]either the purport of any communication between the called and the recipient

224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235

Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 740–44; Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213–16 (2018).
Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
Id. at 742.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 745–46.
Press Release, Apple & Google, supra note 44.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
Press Release, Apple & Google, supra note 44.
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of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed
by pen registers.”236 The same can be said of contact tracing apps. The
conversation is not recorded, the parties are anonymous,237 and whether
substantial interaction occurred is unclear.
Pen registers and contact tracing are also similar because the information
collected by each serves a state interest. In Smith, the Supreme Court noted that
pen registers might be helpful in identifying parties making annoying or obscene
calls when deciding whether a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred.238
Indisputably, the state interest served through contact tracing apps is much more
serious and pressing. Worldwide, COVID-19 caused over 5 million deaths and
over 200 million more have suffered from non-fatal cases.239 It must not be
forgotten that contact tracing apps are a response to these deaths. Both research
and global anecdotes indicate apps have potential when it comes to flattening
the curve and saving lives and could serve their greatest purpose when society
reopens and people are out and about but still risk spreading disease.240 Although
the Smith Court was not explicit about how state interest factored into its
assessment of whether a legitimate expectation of privacy existed,241 its
inclusion of this fact suggests it is a valid, if not important, consideration.
Whether digital contact tracing involves a legitimate expectation of privacy and
whether the data can be obtained without a warrant would involve some attention
to the public health crisis and the social need this technology attempts to address.
Finally, the Smith Court stressed that phone books indicated to subscribers
that telephone companies often help law enforcement officers identify those
making unwanted calls.242 Ultimately, the Court decided the use of a pen register
did not violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment right, and law enforcement
could collect that data without a warrant and use it as evidence against a
defendant in a criminal case.243 Again, a comparison can be drawn between this
fact and contact tracing as it has been implemented in the United States. Written
disclaimers for Apple and Google’s digital contact tracing technology suggest
there are some entities legally allowed to de-anonymize the information
236

Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)).
Press Release, Apple & Google, supra note 44.
238
Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.
239
Mortality Analyses, supra note 65.
240
Mia Sato, Contact Tracing Apps Now Cover Nearly Half of America. It’s Not Too Late to Use One,
MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/12/14/1014426/covid-californiacontact-tracing-app-america-states/.
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See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–43.
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Id. at 742 (citing United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174–75 (1977)).
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collected.244 Based on those disclaimers and the public’s knowledge surrounding
the purpose of these apps, law enforcement could probably use contact tracing
data without a warrant for any purpose, whether it be sufficiently related to
public health or for the advancement of other law enforcement objectives, like
those of the officers in Smith.245
C. Carpenter and Contact Tracing: “Shared” as One Normally Understands
Carpenter involved technology—new to society and the Court—with
similarities to contact tracing technology.246 In Carpenter, the Supreme Court
decided the government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when
it accesses historical cell phone records that chronicle its user’s detailed
movements.247 In some ways, it might seem like the Carpenter decision would
foreclose an outcome in any case involving digital contact tracing through
smartphones because the data implicated appears to be quite similar. But that
case was narrowly decided, applying only to real-time cell-site location
information.248 Digital contact tracing data bears similarities to cell-site location
information because it reveals information about a user’s location, but there are
marked differences in the ways these data sets are collected.249 In the context of
digital contact tracing, Carpenter is distinguishable because contact tracing data
(1) is truly shared and is understood to reveal some location information, (2) is
less intrusive than GPS-data collection, and (3) involves some natural limit, or
application to a specific circumstance.250
First, as the Court asserted, the location information in Carpenter was not
information “truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term.”251 The data
at issue in Carpenter was collected “without any affirmative act on the part of
the user” beyond simply using the cell phone.252 The Court reasoned that
244

Data Rights for Exposure Notification, supra note 218.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
246
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
247
Id. at 2220.
248
Id. (“Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time
CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ (a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site
during a particular interval).”).
249
Data Rights for Exposure Notification, supra note 218.
250
Compare Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–18 (involving GPS-data that was not “truly shared” and
involved no natural limit), with Press Release, Apple & Google, supra note 44 (noting that app users choose to
share location data via Bluetooth technology for the specific purpose of combatting COVID-19).
251
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
252
Id. (“Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls, texts, or e-mails
and countless other data connections that a phone automatically makes when checking for news, weather, or
social media updates.”).
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carrying a cell phone is so commonplace that it is almost necessary to
“participation in modern society.”253 Therefore, the Court concluded, Carpenter
maintained privacy in his cell phone location information because there had been
no meaningful assumption of risk.254 Carpenter’s location was recorded without
his explicit permission.255
In contrast, digital contact tracing requires an affirmative act on the part of
the user. Citizens must opt in by downloading the app or activating its use.256
Users’ information, therefore, is “truly shared” as one normally understands the
term257—in choosing to use the app, which has a specific purpose, users are
opting to share their location information so that it can be compared with the
location information of other users.258 The developers of contact tracing apps—
namely Apple and Google in the United States—and activists alike have assured
users that contact tracing apps are entirely voluntary.259 In fact, the voluntary
nature of the apps dominates press on this issue in the hope that it will promote
buy-in.260 This aspect of the technology has serious implications under a Katz
analysis. If users have to opt in when installing the contact tracing app on their
mobile devices, once they turn on their phones’ Bluetooth capabilities and
upload their personal data to the database, they arguably have no subjective
expectation of privacy. The first part of Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectation
of privacy test261 would have to be answered in the negative. Moreover, users
must continue opting in each step of the way, making it abundantly clear to all
involved that use of the app is a choice.262 And even though contact tracing apps
are downloaded onto phones, they are distinct from the functioning of the phone
itself.263 While there may be morality-based reasons to use these apps—since
public health experts call for widespread adoption of the technology264—they
are not so ubiquitous or socially expected as to be equivalent to the use of phones
generally.265 Finally, every person who downloads the app can stop sharing data
253

Id.
Id. (“[I]n no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over a
comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.” (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)).
255
Id.
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Data Rights for Exposure Notification, supra note 218.
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Chief Justice Roberts considered what it truly means to share data when determining whether an
individual had a legitimate expectation of privacy. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
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Data Rights for Exposure Notification, supra note 218.
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Press Release, Apple & Google, supra note 44.
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Foy, supra note 37.
261
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during particular moments in time or completely delete the technology from
their device as they see fit—even though this would limit the usefulness of the
contact tracing data.266
Second, Apple and Google have asserted that their contact tracing apps are
less intrusive than GPS tracking. In Carpenter, the Court specifically discussed
the “unique nature” of cell phone location records.267 These records are
“detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled” because phones are, for the
most part, always on an individual’s person.268 The Court decided that Carpenter
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his physical location, even
though those records were generated for commercial purposes by the carriers,
because of this unique nature.269 Digital contact tracing is distinguishable
because tracing technology might be seen as more “rudimentary”270 than cellsite location information. The Court in Carpenter concluded tracking made
possible with cell-site location data is, for the purposes of its analysis, equivalent
to GPS monitoring.271 When it comes to contact tracing, app developers with the
most prominence in the United States have incontrovertibly differentiated their
technology from GPS monitoring.272 Developers insist that Bluetooth signals are
more privacy-friendly than GPS data because Bluetooth signals show the
proximity of two users, not an estimate of a user’s locations.273 This
contention—that Bluetooth technology protects data privacy more than GPS
technology—might mean that under Fourth Amendment analysis, contact
tracing data would be classified as less intrusive than the information in
Carpenter. But it does not take much imagination to see how digital proximity
data might be used to determine a person’s location, even if in a more
roundabout way,274 or how it directly provides location data if one considers the
installation of Bluetooth beacons in various locations.275 With this in mind, it is
266

Press Release, Apple & Google, supra note 44.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
268
Id. at 2216.
269
Id. at 2217 (“Mapping a cell phone’s location over the course of 127 days provides an all-encompassing
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at 2215.
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Id. at 2217–18.
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Press Release, Apple & Google, supra note 44, at 2–3.
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FIGLIOLA, supra note 6.
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Christopher McFadden, Are You Being Tracked by Bluetooth Beacons While Shopping?, INTERESTING
ENG’G (June 20, 2019), https://interestingengineering.com/are-you-being-tracked-by-bluetooth-beacons-whileshopping#:~:text=Unlike%20other%20location%20services%2C%20like,and%20work%20incredibly%20well
%20indoors.
275
Id.
267

FONG_1.31.22

686

1/31/2022 3:19 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:655

clear that Bluetooth data yields a pretty comprehensive picture of a person’s life,
but is probably outside the bounds of protection offered by the Fourth
Amendment under Supreme Court precedent, particularly Carpenter.276
In addition, the purpose for which contact tracing data is collected and stored
is the physical location data itself.277 Therefore, determining that there is an
expectation of privacy in those physical locations is not as straightforward as it
was in Carpenter, where the user’s reason for using the technology was
unrelated to and not dependent on the company’s collection of location data.278
A court might conclude that the very specific function of these apps results in a
different outcome with respect to whether the third-party doctrine overcomes the
user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.
Third, contact tracing and the information at issue in Carpenter can be
distinguished by the idea of a natural limit.279 In Carpenter, the Court placed
significance on the fact that the cell-site records at issue were retrospective.280
Police officers do not need an established suspect from the outset to make use
of cell-site data.281 Instead, information concerning movements can be retrieved
after the person has become the suspect in an investigation282—as was the case
in Carpenter, where law enforcement used Carpenter’s phone signals to place
him near robberies he was later charged with committing.283 The Court remarked
that because there is no natural limit on this information and because it is
extremely revealing, the information should be protected by the Fourth
Amendment.284
Contact tracing might be viewed differently. First, if contact tracing data was
used in a case involving a health-related criminal violation, the Court might
determine that this specified charge imposes some sort of natural limit. Instead
of being used for a purpose entirely unrelated to the initial reason data was
collected, the law enforcement purpose could be rationally linked to the
particular purpose the user had in downloading the technology.285 Second, it
276

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
See Press Release, Apple & Google, supra note 44, at 3.
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could be argued that another limit is imposed by the certain context in which
these apps are used. Although contact tracing is a smartphone app that lives on
an individual’s phone, it is not something that society imagines as having an
indefinite purpose, like the smartphone itself.286 The apps are only useful for as
long as a virus poses a threat.287 Furthermore, while cell-site location data is
“ever alert,”288 an individual using contact tracing technology always has the
option of turning off the app for a short-term or long-term period.289 This type
of control might distinguish the data collected via contact tracing from the data
before the Court in Carpenter.290
Fourth and finally, in Carpenter, the Court considered how the data at issue
captured public movements.291 The Court cited to one of its earlier cases, United
States v. Knotts, where it was held that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one place to another.”292 In Knotts, the Court declared the government’s
use of a beeper to track a vehicle’s movements did not constitute a search under
the Fourth Amendment because those movements would have been visible to
anyone with an interest.293 Therefore, “Knotts could not assert a privacy interest
in the information obtained.”294 But the Carpenter Court distinguished the case
at hand from Knotts, with guidance from Jones, based on the pervasiveness of
the surveillance.295 The Court reasoned that the government’s tracking of Knotts
in a particular automotive journey was far less invasive than the long-term
surveillance disputed in Carpenter.296 Imposing this analysis on a contact tracing
context, authorities might first argue that contact tracing only reveals
information that would have been publicly available.297 That argument would
probably fail given the Carpenter analysis.298 But, in the context of quarantinerelated charges, proponents of a valid search or seizure might contend that the
if the government uses contact tracing data as evidence that an individual violated quarantine measures.
286
See Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing, supra note 95 (announcing Apple’s partnership with Google
to “slow the spread of COVID-19 and accelerate the return of everyday life”).
287
See id. (announcing a collaborative agreement between Apple and Google to use technology “to help
governments and health agencies reduce the spread of the virus”).
288
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
289
Press Release, Apple & Google, supra note 44, at 5.
290
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intrusion is more limited, like in Knotts,299 if it pertains to the site and fallout of
a specific incident of exposure, instead of an individual’s entire location history.
D. The Special Needs Doctrine
Outside of the discussions raised by Smith and Carpenter, another
consideration is whether the search and seizure that might arise from contact
tracing qualifies for a special needs exception. The answer to this question likely
rests on the specific aim for which the contact tracing data was used in a given
case.300 If the data was needed for a health-related purposes “beyond the normal
need for law enforcement,”301 then there might be an exception to the warrant
requirement. The Supreme Court has not recognized disease control within the
nation as a special need in previous Fourth Amendment cases; but, given the
severe consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, disease control could fit under
a general need for public safety.302 Analysis in the COVID-19 context might also
differ because police officers are usually the only ones privy to the needs at hand.
Public recognition of a special need—an efficient contact tracing system—might
also factor in, either under an analysis of the special needs doctrine or the general
analysis of an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy and society’s
objective allowance303 regarding this expectation.
Ultimately, whether digital contact tracing entails a legitimate expectation
of privacy is unclear. The information revealed is ambiguous, advances a public
health interest, provides notice to users that it might be used by other entities,304
and is perceived by society as “unsafe” with respect to app privacy—hence the
low adoption rates.305 The data is “truly shared,”306 reveals location information,
is distinct from GPS data, and comes with some natural limit, or pertinence to
specific COVID-19-related circumstances.307 So, it seems probable that an
expectation of privacy would be deemed unreasonable. On the other hand, it
seems counter-intuitive to say society is not prepared to recognize expectations
of privacy associated with life-saving technology that requires people to
volunteer information—especially under an analysis that purports to be
reasonable. If the state has an interest in promoting public health and saving
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307

Id. at 2219–20.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78–81 (2001).
New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 351–53 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Mortality Analyses, supra note 65.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Data Rights for Exposure Notification, supra note 218.
Lehmann, supra note 79.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
Press Release, Apple & Google, supra note 44, at 2–3, 5.

FONG_1.31.22

2022]

1/31/2022 3:19 PM

COVID-19 AND DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING

689

lives, and Supreme Court cases cannot be applied with clarity to this novel
situation, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should be reconsidered.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A logical place to start in developing an alternative theory of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is with the concurrences in Jones and the dissents in
Carpenter. These opinions highlight frustration, and, at times, indignation, with
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.308
A. Concurrences and Dissents in Jones and Carpenter
In Jones, Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor discussed broad ideas
surrounding new technologies and privacy in their respective concurring
opinions. Justice Alito suggested that new technology may provide increased
convenience or security at the expense of privacy, but that society might
consider this tradeoff worthwhile, or, at the very least, inevitable.309 In response,
Justice Sotomayor urged that it might be time to reconsider the third-party
doctrine, calling that “approach ill-suited to the digital age, in which people
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course
of carrying out mundane tasks.”310 In contrast to Justice Alito, she remarked that
the public might not be willing to accept the diminution of privacy as
inevitable.311
The points raised in the four Carpenter dissents are applicable and give a
fuller picture of the strongest contentions on each side of the debate in
Carpenter. The dissents represent proposals or support for other methods of
analysis that differ from current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the ways
it is understood and misunderstood.312
Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion313 asserted that cell-site records are of
the same variety as many other kinds of business records the government has a

308
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418–31 (Alito,
J., concurring in the judgment); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223–35 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2235–46
(Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2246–61 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2261–72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
309
Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
310
Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
311
Id. at 417–18.
312
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223–35 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2235–46 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id.
at 2246–61 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2261–72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
313
Justices Thomas and Alito joined Justice Kennedy’s dissent. Id. at 2223, 2229–30, 2235 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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lawful right to obtain.314 Justice Kennedy concluded that Carpenter did not own,
possess, control, or use the contested records, and for that reason Carpenter had
no reasonable expectation that disclosure of these records would require a
warrant.315 He argued that the majority’s decision offered inconsistent
protections,316 and he would instead limit the Fourth Amendment to its propertybased origins.317 Further, with respect to the cell-site data, he concluded that
location information, which is often disclosed to the public at large, is not more
private than financial and telephonic records, which are available without a
warrant.318
Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion emphasized the property-based
approach to Fourth Amendment questions.319 In Justice Thomas’s view, the case
could not be resolved by asking whether a search occurred.320 Instead, he argued
the case should turn on whose property was searched.321 Justice Thomas argued
overtly that Katz should be rejected and concluded Carpenter involved no
Fourth Amendment violation because the information retrieved did not belong
to Carpenter.322
Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion323 distinguished between an actual search
involving law enforcement officers entering private premises and an order
“merely requiring a party to look through its own records and produce specified
documents”—with the former being more intrusive than the latter.324 Justice
Alito criticized the majority for broadening the Fourth Amendment’s reach and
departing from long-established tradition.325 He emphasized that the Carpenter
decision inappropriately “allow[ed] a defendant to object to the search of a third
party’s property.”326 He defended this point with reference to the text of the
314
Id. at 2223 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court has twice held that individuals have no Fourth
Amendment interests in business records which are possessed, owned, and controlled by a third party.”).
315
Id. at 2228–29.
316
Id. at 2224 (“[I]t draws an unprincipled and unworkable line between cell-site records on the one hand
and financial and telephonic records on the other. . . . That distinction is illogical and will frustrate principled
application of the Fourth Amendment in many routine yet vital law enforcement operations.”).
317
Id. at 2235.
318
Id. at 2233.
319
Id. at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“This case . . . should turn on . . . whose property was searched. .
. . By obtaining the cell-site records of MetroPCS and Sprint, the Government did not search Carpenter’s
property.”).
320
Id.
321
Id.
322
Id. at 2235–36.
323
Id. at 2246 (Alito, J., dissenting).
324
Id. at 2247.
325
Id.
326
Id.
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Amendment, asserting that “[t]he Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects’ . . . , not the
persons, houses, papers and effects of others.”327 According to Justice Alito, the
third-party doctrine is not a new, judge-made theory.328 Rather, it is a direct
reading of what the Amendment protects.329
Finally, Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion330 disagreed with the
majority’s notion that the third-party doctrine could be overcome based on the
nature of the information.331 Instead, he read Smith and Miller as having
announced a categorical rule that was likely misguided.332 Justice Gorsuch also
asserted that the Katz test is neither sufficiently justified nor successful.333
However, in his view, a solution exists:334 returning to the traditional
approach.335 Under the traditional approach, the Fourth Amendment was
triggered simply if the house, paper, or effect belonged to the individual claiming
a violation.336 And protections for papers and effects did not dissipate just
because they were shared with other parties.337
In short, all four Carpenter dissents suggested alternate ways of interpreting
the Fourth Amendment and proposed that the Court go in a different direction.
B. A Needed “New Normal”
The failure of digital contact tracing in the United States—despite the
pressing need presented by the COVID-19 pandemic—highlights significant
flaws in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Even though changes to the Fourth
Amendment framework might not encourage privacy-minded Americans to opt
in to life-saving technology, the Americans who do opt in should be afforded
reasonable Fourth Amendment protections. Currently, precedents do the
opposite.

327

Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
Id. at 2255.
329
Id.
330
Id. at 2261 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
331
Id. at 2262.
332
Id.
333
Id. at 2264–65.
334
Id. at 2262 (suggesting the Court could “maintain Smith and Miller, and live with the consequences,”
“set Smith and Miller aside and try again using the Katz ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ jurisprudence,” or
“look for answers elsewhere”).
335
Id. at 2267–71.
336
Id. at 2267–68.
337
Id. at 2268 (“[T]he fact that a third party has access to or possession of your papers and effects does
not necessarily eliminate your interest in them . . . . Entrusting your stuff to others is a bailment.”).
328
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First, the Katz test should be overturned. Digital contact tracing aside, a
constitutional right should not rest on an individual’s subjective expectation of
privacy.338 When digital contact tracing is considered, the subjective nature of
the test is entirely unworkable. As Justice Alito pointed out, technology changes
dramatically all the time.339 It is almost inevitable that “popular expectations”
will consistently be in flux.340 Press coverage surrounding contact tracing apps
highlights real-time fluctuation. And in this period of flux, whether it is more
reasonable to consider the data private or public is anyone’s guess. Any attempt
to answer this question—the question posed by the Katz test341—is not
appropriately founded on legal, or even normative, reasoning.
In addition, the Katz test results in bad policy. Justice Alito suggested that
many will find privacy tradeoffs worthwhile as technology advances,342 but this
has not been the case with respect to digital contact tracing. In the United States,
adoption of digital contact tracing has been much lower than in other
countries,343 which is reflected in the United States’ absolute and relative failure
in responding to COVID-19.344 As Justice Sotomayor said, “Perhaps . . . some
people may find the ‘tradeoff’ of privacy for convenience ‘worthwhile,’ or come
to accept this ‘diminution of privacy’ as ‘inevitable,’ and perhaps not.”345
Surveys show that privacy is a concern for the majority of Americans.346
Attempting to base Fourth Amendment protections on reasonable expectations
of privacy tradeoffs is too arbitrary and leaves individuals feeling unprotected.
Understanding how beneficial and needed new technologies can be, it stands to
reason that the law surrounding these technologies should encourage
participation, not make citizens wary.
Second, the Court should overturn the third-party doctrine. As Justice
Sotomayor noted, the doctrine no longer functions.347 Today, relinquishment of
personal information is required in too many instances to make the third-party
doctrine worthwhile. As Chief Justice Roberts reasoned, “Cell phone location

338

Amsterdam, supra note 208, at 384.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
340
Id.
341
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
342
Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
343
Lehmann, supra note 79.
344
Barber, supra note 47.
345
Jones, 565 U.S. at 417–18.
346
Brooke Auxier, How Americans See Digital Privacy Issues Amid the COVID-19 Outbreak, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (May 4, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/04/how-americans-see-digital-privacy-issues-amidthe-covid-19-outbreak/.
347
Jones, 565 U.S. at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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information is not really ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term.”348
Justice Kennedy noted that “draw[ing] an unprincipled and unworkable line
between cell-site records on the one hand and financial and telephonic records
on the other” is illogical.349 And Justice Gorsuch acknowledged “the fact that a
third party has access to or possession of your papers and effects does not
necessarily eliminate your interest in them.”350 In the modern era, data circulates
from party to party without much intention or thought, so elimination of this
doctrine is more true to the original rationale for the doctrine itself.351
Third and finally, the limited holding in Carpenter—specific to cell-site
location information352—should be extended. Bluetooth data, both in the context
of digital contact tracing and in other contexts, is not really “shared.” Although
the information it provides is more ambiguous than cell-site location information
or GPS data, the Court should acknowledge that Bluetooth data can be used to
create “social graphs” that unveil a user’s social interactions353 and that this
indirect access violates the Fourth Amendment to the same extent as free flowing
location data.
CONCLUSION
Dissents and concurrences in Fourth Amendment digital technology cases
highlight frustration, and at times indignation, with current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Digital contact tracing—and a desire to make it more attractive
to individuals for the sake of public health—provides clear justifications for
making changes to the existing Fourth Amendment framework. A “new normal”
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will help ensure the government is able to
not only protect Fourth Amendment rights but also promote public health and
save lives.
As it stands, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence forces U.S. citizens to choose
between health and privacy. Eliminating the Katz test and the third-party
doctrine might not result in widespread adoption of contact tracing apps
overnight but will protect those who choose to use this life-saving technology,
whether in the current context of COVID-19 or in the future. The law should not

348

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
Id. at 2224.
350
Id. at 2268 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
351
The third-party doctrine is underscored by the notion that an individual has control over their
information and can maintain or relinquish that control. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
352
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
353
Lomas, supra note 52.
349
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be so fickle and should not disadvantage those who try to promote the common
good—both in general and when public health is at stake. Fourth Amendment
protections should extend to location data collected by this technology.
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